At today's FCIC hearing witnesses cited MBS Ratings were "triple AAA, senior tranches, super seniors" BUT something very impotent was missin' - those securities had not seen the light of day in an Arms length trade - 100% different breed of cat compared to an MBS that was bought and sold!
Where was the or any VOLUME of trading goin' on - on most of the toxic derivatives building up on and off the balance sheets of the CSE's?
Perhaps an analysis of MBS trading VOLUME month to month would show - as stated here in July 2007 that many of these securities probably traded "by appointment" i.e. infrequently, read less than hoped for - yet the AAA ratings persisted.
http://www.fiduciaryexpert.com/page3.html
Speakin' of volume - and the lack thereof excuse me, the volume WAS goin' on somewhere as penned earlier today ON and OFF sponsors', issuers' often notably one and the same underwriters' balance sheets! And as if Wall Streeters don't know this - when a company is holding a block of stock ready to issue into the market from a shelf offering - it will have what?
OVERHANG - yes - like a HANGOVER.
A dampening, more realistically a depressing effect on that stock - the stock which is BEING traded in and on the markets; YET somehow the same Wall Streeters reckoned that the OVERHANG of MBS and related derivatives inventory was above and beyond the dilutive effect of more of the same flooding the market!
So - it doesn't take much to see some conflicts - the rising waves of CASH compensation were SO enjoyable during 2003 to 2007 that executives state "No one saw the crash, the tsunami" but as Mr Angelides said today there were warning signs - ignored by those who's firms WERE holding back the flood waters of MBS and related derivatives; stored on and off balance sheet, totally self created, held, NOT sold (and why was/is that?), month after month, "ratified" in the parlance of Wall St respondents (a reversal of their PRIMARY defense against public customers) and this IMPORTANTLY NOT ONE WALL ST CSE IS SUING ANOTHER BASED ON LACK OF CAPACITY - HUH?
MEANS THEY KNOW THAT THE OTHERS KNEW THAT THEY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT GAME - CHARADE WAS BEING PERPETRATED EVEN UPON THEIR OWN FIRMS - AFTER ALL THEY WERE GETTING PAID IN CASH. AND AS PRACTICE ON WALL ST - HE WHO EARNS THE MOST GETS TO APPOINT AND ANOINT FUTURE LEADERS - MOUTHPIECES OF THE SAME; IT'S NO LESS POLITICAL THAN WASHINGTON OR CHICAGO POLITICS.
When it comes to "control' see my submission to the FDIC August 2009 here http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2009/09c01AD48.PDF
More on Ratings - some lessons seemingly forgotten, and ratings DO NOT EQUAL VALUE - never have never will!!
A rating is only ONE characteristic, supposed marque of value, ONE ratings agency's opinion. Coins can be graded brilliant uncirculated or proof - that doesn't CAUSE a third party to pay par or any value whatsoever, let alone the holder's expectation of value will be assigned in a trade, Postage Stamps the same way.
Why would these executives, managers, supervisors believe any different unless of course they were listening TO - instead of ASKING hard hitting, tackle NOT touch football questions of - their (conflicted) prop traders or their auditors - ya' think?
Lessons of Enron and Worldcom BONDS - oh how about the WPPS (Washington Public Power Supply) bonds - all rated solid investment grade, some even at the top rung - and what happened? Poof - accounting scandal here, fraud there, as if MBS were above ANY fray!
Let alone - sub prime, interest only or Alt A - was the underwriting at origination a AAA process? You know and everyone KNEW the answer to that WHEN - AT THE TIME - it was goin' on - correct me if I am wrong.
Incredible siesta continuing on the US taxpayers' dime - hoping to see some major Compensation Clawback, Jail time for some singularly obsessed with RATINGS!
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Wall St Fraud - may better be proved by what was NOT done, choices NOT made, reps & warranties NOT made
Yes - it's all about Information - that can create value but before value is conceieved we must consider the epistemology of the acquisition, indeed awareness of the presence of information which may become knowledge - leading to expectations, concerns, and risk and reward, indeed pricing of same.
So when Wall St spends upwards of billions of dollars per annum on systems and people - who has the MOST information?
The house.
Financial markets are based upon "fair dealing" - so is it fair to:
NOT share the other side of a trade?
Is it fair to hide the genesis of the idea to create the transaction?
Is it fair to NOT share with a 3rd party collateral manager, there to act as an arms length intermediary so as to avoid certain conflicts, the purpose, parties of a transaction?
Would Goldman feel treated fairly if in the position of their customers and denied information known and possessed? I doubt it.
Join me in the Clawback Coalition for the recovery of billions of past CASH bonuses paid to certain Wall St traders, managers, supervisors and officers and boards.
Cash bonuses the result of CONVERSION - fraudulent asset valuations on and off balance sheet at certain investment banks. Simply stated Asset values set the stage, the compensation base of proprietary traders' cash compensation.
Join me - one word comes to mind for these types of individuals - JAIL.
So when Wall St spends upwards of billions of dollars per annum on systems and people - who has the MOST information?
The house.
Financial markets are based upon "fair dealing" - so is it fair to:
NOT share the other side of a trade?
Is it fair to hide the genesis of the idea to create the transaction?
Is it fair to NOT share with a 3rd party collateral manager, there to act as an arms length intermediary so as to avoid certain conflicts, the purpose, parties of a transaction?
Would Goldman feel treated fairly if in the position of their customers and denied information known and possessed? I doubt it.
Join me in the Clawback Coalition for the recovery of billions of past CASH bonuses paid to certain Wall St traders, managers, supervisors and officers and boards.
Cash bonuses the result of CONVERSION - fraudulent asset valuations on and off balance sheet at certain investment banks. Simply stated Asset values set the stage, the compensation base of proprietary traders' cash compensation.
Join me - one word comes to mind for these types of individuals - JAIL.
2,000 X Leverage - UNAVOIDABLE result of implicit and explicit leverage in MBS derivatives - why it's still a casino until US creditors wake up
A buyer who puts down 20% $100k allows purchase of a $500k house = 5 times leverage.
A different buyer who puts down the same $100k but as 10% down can buy a house for $1MM = 10 X leverage.
A buyer who puts ZERO $ down = 100 X leverage.
And when Wall St Banks or CSE's then underwrote, issued securities or derivatives - distributed to reliant buyers, then amassed same on balance sheet at 20 or more X leverage = what?
Minimum, 2,000 times total leverage (20 times 100 x leverage in the case of zero down mortgages) when underlying mortgages were interest only or made for more than 100% of property value - GREATER than 2,000 x economic and financial leverage!
Regulators - personally unaware?
No regulator - Mr Bernanke, Mr Greenspan, Mr Geithner, Mr Paulson, others? They drove to work with eye's closed, entered their neighborhoods then homes each evening - UNAWARE OF - HOUSE FLIPPING?????
Perhaps Regulators were in a bubble - a MENTAL, MODEL bubble - indeed one of their OWN choice and creation.
Upon one asset class - REAL ESTATE - overvalued by any measure - come on - no one in authority or CEO leadership could see this?
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayers' dime one little, easy to read blog at a time.
A different buyer who puts down the same $100k but as 10% down can buy a house for $1MM = 10 X leverage.
A buyer who puts ZERO $ down = 100 X leverage.
And when Wall St Banks or CSE's then underwrote, issued securities or derivatives - distributed to reliant buyers, then amassed same on balance sheet at 20 or more X leverage = what?
Minimum, 2,000 times total leverage (20 times 100 x leverage in the case of zero down mortgages) when underlying mortgages were interest only or made for more than 100% of property value - GREATER than 2,000 x economic and financial leverage!
Regulators - personally unaware?
No regulator - Mr Bernanke, Mr Greenspan, Mr Geithner, Mr Paulson, others? They drove to work with eye's closed, entered their neighborhoods then homes each evening - UNAWARE OF - HOUSE FLIPPING?????
Perhaps Regulators were in a bubble - a MENTAL, MODEL bubble - indeed one of their OWN choice and creation.
Upon one asset class - REAL ESTATE - overvalued by any measure - come on - no one in authority or CEO leadership could see this?
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayers' dime one little, easy to read blog at a time.
It's clear - RATINGS did not change upon Bear's or Lehman's AAA holdings - rather...
When Bear Stearns and when Lehman's customers, clearing banks and counterparties - walked away -
it was NOT due to a change in the AAA ratings of their holdings -
there was NO such ratings agency change -
the KNOWN and widely held belief that AAA securities ratings were one thing -
NOT TO BE RELIED UPON OR TRUSTED - in so far as as far back as 2007 the ratings agencies began holding meetings with CSE's on exactly that topic.
When the CSE's in part engaged in IBGYBG (I'll be gone, you'll be gone) behaviors with ratings agencies - WHEN - INITIAL RATINGS WERE ASSIGNED - it's as if tainted beef was not only snuck into the market - it was created, it was discussed, it was negotiated by and between the issuers, and close if not the same controlled underwriters then sold with AAA ratings that were known to be less than what customers / buyers were likely led to believe; subject to proof.
Again ending the siesta on the US Taxpayer's dime one little, easy to read blog at a time.
it was NOT due to a change in the AAA ratings of their holdings -
there was NO such ratings agency change -
the KNOWN and widely held belief that AAA securities ratings were one thing -
NOT TO BE RELIED UPON OR TRUSTED - in so far as as far back as 2007 the ratings agencies began holding meetings with CSE's on exactly that topic.
When the CSE's in part engaged in IBGYBG (I'll be gone, you'll be gone) behaviors with ratings agencies - WHEN - INITIAL RATINGS WERE ASSIGNED - it's as if tainted beef was not only snuck into the market - it was created, it was discussed, it was negotiated by and between the issuers, and close if not the same controlled underwriters then sold with AAA ratings that were known to be less than what customers / buyers were likely led to believe; subject to proof.
Again ending the siesta on the US Taxpayer's dime one little, easy to read blog at a time.
Appears Wall St CSEs dramatic increased balance sheet leverage replaced Buyers' liquidity & became a nuclear waste REPOSITORY for Level 2 and 3 assets
AFTER same Wall St firms attracted buyers of Derivatives, buyers appetite sated, then CSE's continued to underwrite new cousins of Derivatives and first generation derivatives - did what? - piled up; where? On and off balance sheet of supposedly regulated entities.
It seems clear that CSE's under the SEC's supervision and extra supervision as pointed out by Ms Borne in today's FCIC hearing -
created liqudity,
witnessed, were on notice and indeed participated in the KILLING of markets,
i.e. the "liquidity" demand provided by erstwhile buyers of derivatives
buyers of their proprietary "housewares" which dried up - this appears:
CSE balance sheet leverage REPLACED liquidity - huh?
As was penned here last year - see link here Leverage blessed Leverage blessed prop trades and (proprietary) Asset Valuations http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/09/leverage-blessed-leverage-for-certain.html
Yet the CASH bonus parade continued its march - huh?
See also http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/07/wall-sts-off-balance-sheet-expansion.html
Cash bonuses the result of ASSET price conversion - an illicit if not an illegal "conversion" it appears, subject to proof; and subject to ""Clawback" if fraudulent or with intent to deceive markets.
CSE's were the largest, most sophisticated players, investment banks on Wall St. The SEC enacted Consolidated Supervised Entities in 2004, discarded 30 years old required capital calculations, allowed CSE's to use their OWN proprietary valuation models to calculate required capital - true not making it up.
Incandescent insights into the so called Economic or Financial Crisis - as if it applies uniformly to all financial institutions - one appears singularly engineered BY and as a RESULT of only certain NY Federal Reserve district banks and investment banks - "Wall St market makers" like Goldman, et al.
When any Investment Bank could have said NO - at any time - to more MBS derivatives underwritings, leverage and PROPRIETARY valuation; but didn't.
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime - one little blog at a time.
It seems clear that CSE's under the SEC's supervision and extra supervision as pointed out by Ms Borne in today's FCIC hearing -
created liqudity,
witnessed, were on notice and indeed participated in the KILLING of markets,
i.e. the "liquidity" demand provided by erstwhile buyers of derivatives
buyers of their proprietary "housewares" which dried up - this appears:
CSE balance sheet leverage REPLACED liquidity - huh?
As was penned here last year - see link here Leverage blessed Leverage blessed prop trades and (proprietary) Asset Valuations http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/09/leverage-blessed-leverage-for-certain.html
Yet the CASH bonus parade continued its march - huh?
See also http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/07/wall-sts-off-balance-sheet-expansion.html
Cash bonuses the result of ASSET price conversion - an illicit if not an illegal "conversion" it appears, subject to proof; and subject to ""Clawback" if fraudulent or with intent to deceive markets.
CSE's were the largest, most sophisticated players, investment banks on Wall St. The SEC enacted Consolidated Supervised Entities in 2004, discarded 30 years old required capital calculations, allowed CSE's to use their OWN proprietary valuation models to calculate required capital - true not making it up.
Incandescent insights into the so called Economic or Financial Crisis - as if it applies uniformly to all financial institutions - one appears singularly engineered BY and as a RESULT of only certain NY Federal Reserve district banks and investment banks - "Wall St market makers" like Goldman, et al.
When any Investment Bank could have said NO - at any time - to more MBS derivatives underwritings, leverage and PROPRIETARY valuation; but didn't.
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime - one little blog at a time.
Sunday, May 2, 2010
Mr Blankfein - so how is that Goldman perennially earns MORE money than anyone?
Can we agree that it's because of the very essence of Goldman's franchise - INFORMATION; it's paid for and exceedingly valuable, otherwise why collect it in the first place? Dare I suggest an abomination - what if same information were shared with customers - then value would disappear.
Sort of like sharing water (or not) with others stranded on a desert island.
And he who has it (information) defines the situation just as he who has it controls the situation - yes; just like a parent with a child.
What is Goldman's IT budget for discretionary purposes i.e. non mandatory regulatory and compliance systems? Why spend the money? Of course, as the circle completes itself - it's better to know ALL available information and DECIDE whether to incorporate it, assign lesser weight or disregard completely.
Goldman and other Investment Banks - for purposes of gaining control and market share of certain customers, products and services; offered certain customized risk products / service not elsewhere available - namely but not limited to certain MBS derivatives.
Private label CDOs, CDOs Squared, and Synthetic CDO's - Goldman in this example, created, traded and valued same using its proprietary IT budget and passed itself off as a market maker, intermediary - BEREFT it seems, of any duty owed to customers.
When a market or market maker - to use your example from the interview on the Charlie Rose Show April 20, 2010 http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10989 replace Goldman with NYSE.
Would it be a fair market for the NYSE to fail to disclose ALL information it possessed?
Example:
If Goldman were to put itself in the position of IKB - would it want to know that certain MBS were actually suggested for inclusion NOT by the independent collateral manager ACA but by Mr Paulson? Not necessarily; but failure to disclose that kind of information by Goldman assumes that IKB was not possessed of other information that once connected may have changed their decision - to buy more, buy less or buy the same amount of Abacus they wound up buying anyway. Later, it may have influenced their continued holding all or part of the Abacus deal - but then a related question is did Goldman provide accurate and FAIR "market price information" in the months following the underwriting and distribution? I'll bet this is an area that could yield useful, litmus test information in contrast to Mr fabulous Fab's subsequent customer marketing or proprietary trading activities.
UBS has long advertised on TV, that UBS stands for and combines to mean U and Us - as if there is a partnership; suggesting that the thousands of UBS employees are there, united for YOUR benefit. Goldman I recall, does not tend to advertise except for displaying the image of its name.
Mr B has stated many times that Goldmans' 35,000 employees don't know what the others are doing - as if position and risk limits are UNmonitored / UNsupervised / UNdiscussed - when in reality it's believed that every position, every minute or more frequently is summarized in the parlance "rolls up" to a level for a manager to see - why else does the manager / supervisor / managing director position exist - managing what?
Would it - let's frame the same challenge of the usefulness of information in a very graphic, stark indeed pornographic way -
It's dark, you're a man, you've been out and want to play in a pleasure palace.
Upon entering, incense invades you, you are led to a small private, dimly lit room, there are several silk sheets each covering someone on the other side; an attractive silhouette catches your interest - you take your pleasure - then out from behind the curtain emerges _____ (fill in the blank) - something different from your initial expectations - would you feel the same elation or feel tricked or _____ (fill in the blank)? Would you ask for a refund? Would you have penetrated armed with the information about the counterparty?
At the end of the day the experience was NOT what you expected correct? However, it doesn't immediately result in a conviction of good or bad, right or wrong rather this - it LEAVES OPEN the possibility of 1) negative, 2) positive or 3) neutral reactions; same, I believe is reasonably applied as with certain Abacus deals.
Redolent of a provocative movie from 2007 Lars and the Real Girl link to comments herehttp://www.imdb.com/title/tt0805564/usercomments?start=38
And as pointed out several times here Goldman as a regulated entity must address how it fulfilled NASD IM 2310-3 Obligations to Institutional Customers (see link to this in below posts) and in a civil litigation how it met its fiduciary duties to certain customers; extending to how it trained and supervised its customer facing employees (sales people), market makers, traders and proprietary traders.
From November 2009 here
http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/11/goldman-sachs-may-not-limbo-under.html
and from January 2010 here
http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2010/01/goldmans-lb-to-fcic-nobody-knew-minute.html
Yes Mr Blankfein - it's all about - INFORMATION and fair and fully disclosed markets.
Otherwise - certain customers may have a less than hoped for experience.
And last I checked Goldman and all other investment banks exist for what purpose?
As stated in a US Bancorp TV ad yesterday "As our country has grown, so have we" recognize the order of priorities?
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime every time.
Sort of like sharing water (or not) with others stranded on a desert island.
And he who has it (information) defines the situation just as he who has it controls the situation - yes; just like a parent with a child.
What is Goldman's IT budget for discretionary purposes i.e. non mandatory regulatory and compliance systems? Why spend the money? Of course, as the circle completes itself - it's better to know ALL available information and DECIDE whether to incorporate it, assign lesser weight or disregard completely.
Goldman and other Investment Banks - for purposes of gaining control and market share of certain customers, products and services; offered certain customized risk products / service not elsewhere available - namely but not limited to certain MBS derivatives.
Private label CDOs, CDOs Squared, and Synthetic CDO's - Goldman in this example, created, traded and valued same using its proprietary IT budget and passed itself off as a market maker, intermediary - BEREFT it seems, of any duty owed to customers.
When a market or market maker - to use your example from the interview on the Charlie Rose Show April 20, 2010 http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10989 replace Goldman with NYSE.
Would it be a fair market for the NYSE to fail to disclose ALL information it possessed?
Example:
If Goldman were to put itself in the position of IKB - would it want to know that certain MBS were actually suggested for inclusion NOT by the independent collateral manager ACA but by Mr Paulson? Not necessarily; but failure to disclose that kind of information by Goldman assumes that IKB was not possessed of other information that once connected may have changed their decision - to buy more, buy less or buy the same amount of Abacus they wound up buying anyway. Later, it may have influenced their continued holding all or part of the Abacus deal - but then a related question is did Goldman provide accurate and FAIR "market price information" in the months following the underwriting and distribution? I'll bet this is an area that could yield useful, litmus test information in contrast to Mr fabulous Fab's subsequent customer marketing or proprietary trading activities.
UBS has long advertised on TV, that UBS stands for and combines to mean U and Us - as if there is a partnership; suggesting that the thousands of UBS employees are there, united for YOUR benefit. Goldman I recall, does not tend to advertise except for displaying the image of its name.
Mr B has stated many times that Goldmans' 35,000 employees don't know what the others are doing - as if position and risk limits are UNmonitored / UNsupervised / UNdiscussed - when in reality it's believed that every position, every minute or more frequently is summarized in the parlance "rolls up" to a level for a manager to see - why else does the manager / supervisor / managing director position exist - managing what?
Would it - let's frame the same challenge of the usefulness of information in a very graphic, stark indeed pornographic way -
It's dark, you're a man, you've been out and want to play in a pleasure palace.
Upon entering, incense invades you, you are led to a small private, dimly lit room, there are several silk sheets each covering someone on the other side; an attractive silhouette catches your interest - you take your pleasure - then out from behind the curtain emerges _____ (fill in the blank) - something different from your initial expectations - would you feel the same elation or feel tricked or _____ (fill in the blank)? Would you ask for a refund? Would you have penetrated armed with the information about the counterparty?
At the end of the day the experience was NOT what you expected correct? However, it doesn't immediately result in a conviction of good or bad, right or wrong rather this - it LEAVES OPEN the possibility of 1) negative, 2) positive or 3) neutral reactions; same, I believe is reasonably applied as with certain Abacus deals.
Redolent of a provocative movie from 2007 Lars and the Real Girl link to comments herehttp://www.imdb.com/title/tt0805564/usercomments?start=38
And as pointed out several times here Goldman as a regulated entity must address how it fulfilled NASD IM 2310-3 Obligations to Institutional Customers (see link to this in below posts) and in a civil litigation how it met its fiduciary duties to certain customers; extending to how it trained and supervised its customer facing employees (sales people), market makers, traders and proprietary traders.
From November 2009 here
http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2009/11/goldman-sachs-may-not-limbo-under.html
and from January 2010 here
http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2010/01/goldmans-lb-to-fcic-nobody-knew-minute.html
Yes Mr Blankfein - it's all about - INFORMATION and fair and fully disclosed markets.
Otherwise - certain customers may have a less than hoped for experience.
And last I checked Goldman and all other investment banks exist for what purpose?
As stated in a US Bancorp TV ad yesterday "As our country has grown, so have we" recognize the order of priorities?
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime every time.
Buffett - little patience for those who failed to DO due diligence - really? How about applied to Goldmans' lack of due diligence upon AIG
As reported in the NY Times, May 1 by Andrew Ross Sorkin, the sage held forth at his annual confab link here http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/buffettpalooza-2010-buffett-defends-goldman/?scp=4&sq=goldman&st=cse
And said this:
"He said those investors (in Goldman's questioned Abacus deal) should have conducted better due diligence. It's hard for me to get terribly sympathetic when a bank (IKB) makes a dumb credit bet."
Hmmmm...let's see - I recall that Goldman got $14B when AIG was bailed out.
Goldman was one of ONLY 16 counterparties to AIG - IN THE WORLD!
Thousands of other financial institutions AVOIDED AIG - including as posted here last year -http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2010/01/were-aig-cds-counterparties-par-payoffs.html
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf
See page 24 for the LUCKY list - lucky because made whole, 100% on the CDS dollar and by all accounts failed Mr Buffett's self defined standard.
Or were there other exigent circumstances?
Was it because Goldman had been in a long running feud with AIG over collateral calls on the one and the same Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Goldman had refused to pay up? Subject to proof, of course.
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime one little blog at a time.
And said this:
"He said those investors (in Goldman's questioned Abacus deal) should have conducted better due diligence. It's hard for me to get terribly sympathetic when a bank (IKB) makes a dumb credit bet."
Hmmmm...let's see - I recall that Goldman got $14B when AIG was bailed out.
Goldman was one of ONLY 16 counterparties to AIG - IN THE WORLD!
Thousands of other financial institutions AVOIDED AIG - including as posted here last year -http://fiduciaryforensics.blogspot.com/2010/01/were-aig-cds-counterparties-par-payoffs.html
- JP Morgan
- Citigroup (Smith Barney)
- Lehman Brothers
- Berkshire Hathaway
- Wells Fargo (a significant Berkshire holding)
- GE Capital
- And every major US insurance company
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf
See page 24 for the LUCKY list - lucky because made whole, 100% on the CDS dollar and by all accounts failed Mr Buffett's self defined standard.
Or were there other exigent circumstances?
Was it because Goldman had been in a long running feud with AIG over collateral calls on the one and the same Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Goldman had refused to pay up? Subject to proof, of course.
Ending the siesta on the US taxpayer's dime one little blog at a time.
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